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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Responding to a recent critique of his work on presumption by David Godden and 
Douglas Walton (2007), Kauffeld raises the question of whether their critique challenges 
the adequacy of his explanation of the concept of presumption, or sets limits on it as a 
basis for conducting day-to-day argumentation. Kauffeld sees the notion that he describes 
as representing an ordinary use of presumption in everyday conversation argumentation, 
while Godden and Walton expressed some doubts about whether or how his notion of 
presumption applies to familiar examples in which presumption is used as practical 
device to fulfill burden of proof under conditions of uncertainty and lack of knowledge 
characteristic of everyday defeasible argumentation.  
 
2. EPISTEMIC AND SOCIAL USES OF PRESUMPTION 
 
The best place to begin is to consider Kauffeld’s leading example. In this example, it is a 
soldier’s duty to raise the flag at dawn, but the soldier is unreliable, tending to sleep in, 
and so the presumption that he will in fact raise the flag is in doubt. According to 
Kauffeld’s account, however, it is still reasonable to presume that the soldier will raise 
the flag, because there is an expectation that he should do so, and there is a social bond 
obliging him to do so. But is this a reasonable presumption? Godden and Walton (2007) 
wrote that we might be entitled to presume that the soldier will raise the flag, but we 
would not be justified in presuming that he will do so. Kauffeld is worried that this 
counterexample might be used to show that his commitment-based view of presumption 
cannot accommodate the defeasible nature of claims advanced in day-to-day 
argumentation. The issue appears to turn on the difference between being entitled to 
presume something will happen and being justified in presuming it will happen. 
This distinction can be clarified by showing that the notion of presumption works 
in somewhat different ways in different contexts of argument use. One of these is what 
might be called the epistemic concept of use, where the purpose of the discussion is to 
resolve the conflict of opinions on whether some particular proposition can be shown to 
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be true, or whether it is subject to doubt. A different type of context is one where a group 
is collaborating together to carry out a common goal in order to try to solve a problem or 
decide on a prudent course of action. In this context of argumentation use, as the 
discussion proceeds, each party puts forward a proposal that is held to be a basis for 
solving the problem that the group confronts. As the argument proceeds, opponents might 
argue that there are reasons against the proposal, while advocates of the proposal try to 
defend against these objections, and cite positive consequences that the implementation 
of the proposal will have with respect to carrying out the common goal of the group. 
Much already has been written on how the notion of presumption should be analyzed in 
epistemic settings, but so far there appears to be no attempt yet in the argumentation 
literature to study how presumption should be analyzed in this action oriented context 
that Kauffeld calls commitment-based. 
Godden and Walton noted, however, that many of the other analyses of the notion 
of presumption, and most notably the leading models presented by Ullman-Margalit 
(1983) and Rescher (2006), appear to be very different in their orientations from 
Kauffeld’s. The standard notion of presumption common to these mainstream accounts is 
that of a practical device used to move by defeasible reasoning to a tentative conclusion 
that cannot be justified by the existing evidence, under conditions of uncertainty and lack 
of knowledge (Walton 2008). For example in law, someone who has disappeared for 
longer than a fixed number of years may be presumed to be dead for the purposes of 
dividing up his estate. It may not be possible to prove (up to the requirements of any 
reasonable standard of proof) that the man is dead. But for practical purposes, something 
has to be done about his estate. The device of presumption enables a court to move 
forward and defeasibly accept the proposition that he is dead, given that there is no 
evidence at all that he is still alive. The setting here might be called an epistemic one. 
There is a need to take action involved, but the problem is whether the proposition that 
the man is dead can be accepted as true or not, based on the evidence that we have at that 
particular time. In legal cases of this sort, the presumption is a tentative conclusion 
derived from facts and legal rules. In this instance, the facts present a negative picture in 
which there is no knowledge about whether the man is dead or alive, but there is a legal 
rule sanctioning the inference that the man may be presumed to be dead if there is no 
evidence all that he is alive (at this time). The rule is defeasible. If the man turns up alive, 
the presumptive inference to the conclusion is then cancelled, even though the legal rule 
still holds. 
There is considerable evidence in Kauffeld’s paper that he is not employing the 
notion of presumption in this way, i.e. as applied to an epistemic setting in which the goal 
is to use argumentation to prove that some proposition is true or false by giving evidence 
that supports it or raises questions about it. Kauffeld writes (p. 11) that in making a 
proposal, a speaker risks criticism for wasting her addressees’ time, and thereby raises a 
presumption that her proposal merits consideration. This doesn’t mean, however, that the 
speaker’s proposal should be presumed to be true. According to Kauffeld’s account, it 
only means that the other parties in the group should presume that her proposal merits 
consideration. Here we see evidence that on Kauffeld’s account, the conditions for 
putting forward and accepting a presumption are different in the social context that he is 
writing about than in the epistemic context that would be typical of the use of 
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presumption in a critical discussion, or other type of dialog where the goal is to prove that 
some proposition is true or not. 
 
3. CO-DEPENDENT RELATIONSHIPS AND COMMITMENT 
 
As Kauffeld tells us, presumption needs to be situated in a framework of practical 
calculations where an agent with moral motivation can take into account the calculations 
of others who are in a co-dependent relationship with that agent. On his account, in this 
setting, presumptions are based on an agent’s commitments, and provide a basis for 
objection and criticism when an agent in such a setting is not living up to expectations 
that he has earlier committed himself to. On Kauffeld’s account, commitments provide 
the basis for presumptive inferences of these sorts.  
Kauffeld’s example of the lazy soldier gives us an idea of the notion of 
presumption he has in mind. The presumption is that Smith will raise the flag, given that 
we have been told by Smith’s commander that she has assigned Smith the duty of raising 
the flag. When this order has been conveyed to Smith, he has an obligation to carry out 
his commitment of raising the flag at the appointed time. Those who are co-dependent 
with Smith in these circumstances are entitled to presume that Smith will act responsibly 
by obeying the command to raise the flag. Some of the other examples used by Kauffeld 
suggest that he is thinking of practical situations where a group is attempting to carry out 
some goal by acting together in a collaborative enterprise.  
On Kauffeld’s account, presumptions have to do with expectations about how one 
member of such a group can be expected to act in light of the plan that the group is 
attempting to move forward with and implement. Kauffeld uses the example of several 
situations that are expressed in a dialog format. One party of the group tells another that 
Smith is notoriously lazy and that discipline on this base is very lax. The other party 
answers that something should be done about that. This answer suggests that the two 
parties are acting together as co-dependents in some plan the two parties are taking part 
in. In another of these small dialogs one party says: “Don’t count on that. Smith is a 
belligerent type. He would rather scrub toilets and accede to his commander’s orders.” 
The other party responds that his commander will take care of that. These dialogs 
illustrate that the participants in them are concerned about the possible consequences of 
some actions that are supposed to be carried out by one of them. More precisely, they are 
concerned about the consequences of somebody failing to carry out the action in 
question. They are contemplating such a possible outcome, and discussing what can be 
done about it. These examples strongly suggest that the context of the dialog is not one of 
finding the truth of the matter being discussed, so much as it is one of a group discussion 
about how to take action in moving ahead with the implementation of a plan. The dialog 
is about actions, and the group of agents who are supposedly involved in attempting to 
carry out these actions together. 
This aspect of Kauffeld’s notion of presumption is even more explicit in another 
example where a teacher says to her class that their papers are due tomorrow and that she 
presumes they will have them in on time, knowing that some members of the class will 
turn their papers in late. Kauffeld remarks that the function of her notification is to put the 
class on notice of the teacher’s application of sanctions to late papers. As Kauffeld 
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remarks, the setting of the use of presumption in such a case is that of our knowledge of 
intentional acts in ordinary reasoning about human conduct. 
In another example Kauffeld discusses further aspects of the structure of 
argumentation in presumptions in a context where co-dependents are engaging in 
argumentation with each other. The point he makes is that presumptions can be 
strengthened or weakened by certain kinds of remarks made by one party to another in a 
dialog. He uses the example where one party borrows a book from another, thereby 
setting a presumption into place that he will return the item in a reasonable time. First, a 
strategy to strengthen the presumption is given when the first party reminds the borrower 
of another person who failed to return an item that he borrowed spent some time in jail. 
Second, a strategy to weaken the presumption is given when the first party gives the 
borrower reason to believe that he rarely has use for the borrowed object, and therefore is 
not so seriously concerned about its being returned by deadline. This example suggests 
that when agents reason together to carry out actions with co-dependents, they have 
dialogs in which one party is presumed to act in a certain way, based on a commitment to 
another party that flows from some actions that both of the parties are involved in. A 
presumption in this setting can be weaker or stronger, depending on a number of factors, 
including the commitments undertaken, and the positive or negative consequences of 
carrying out that commitment or failing to carry it out. In addition however, such 
presumptions can be strengthened or weakened by contributions to the dialog made by 
each party following the initial presumption that has been set in place as a commitment of 
one of the parties. Thus presumption can be seen, on this model, as based on a form of 
collaborative argumentation in which two or more parties take part by attempting to carry 
out a common goal and making agreements with each other on how each party and the 
group can best collaborate in the sequence of actions needed to carry out this goal. 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
One of the problems with the notion of presumption is that it is often used in a narrower 
and more technical way in epistemic contexts, for example in evidence law. In such 
contexts, the concept of presumption is defined in an epistemic way in which it refers to a 
type of inference from a set of facts and rules to a conclusion that is tentatively accepted 
in a proceeding for practical reasons. It is defined this way in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and other legal writings—see (Walton, 2008)—and the accounts put forward by 
Ullman-Margalit (1983) and Rescher (2006) are attempts to offer rigorous analyses of 
this concept. Kauffeld’s notion of presumption is different, indeed so much so that some 
might say that what it defines should be called a social expectation rather than a 
presumption. It has been shown above, however, that there are some grounds for thinking 
that Kauffeld’s notion may have a place in a context of argument different from the 
epistemic one. I have suggested a hypothesis that represents one way of viewing 
Kauffeld’s notion of presumption. The hypothesis is that his notion of presumption finds 
a place in a context of argumentation different from the epistemic one. This different 
context is the use of argumentation to support and criticize proposals for action when a 
group of co-dependents is engaged in carrying out a plan in order to work together to 
implement common goals.  
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